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PANELIST PAPERS 
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INTRODUCTION: SANDEL’S AND DWORKIN’S CONCEPTIONS OF JUSTICE 
As we did a year ago, we gather here at Boston University School of Law 
for a symposium on justice.  Last year, our topic was Ronald Dworkin’s then 
forthcoming (and now published) book, Justice for Hedgehogs.1  This year, our 
 
* Professor of Law and Paul M. Siskind Research Scholar, Boston University School of 
Law. 
** Professor of Law, The Honorable Frank R. Kenison Distinguished Scholar in Law, and 
Associate Dean for Research and Intellectual Life, Boston University School of Law.  We 
prepared this essay for the symposium on Michael J. Sandel’s Justice: What’s the Right 
Thing to Do?, held at Boston University School of Law, October 14, 2010.  We thank Eric 
Lee for helpful research assistance.  In Part V, in analyzing the California Supreme Court’s 
decision recognizing a right to same-sex marriage, we draw from Linda C. McClain, Red 
Versus Blue (and Purple) States in the Same-Sex Marriage Debate: From Values 
Polarization to Common Ground?, 77 UMKC L. REV. 415 (2008); Linda C. McClain & 
Joanna Grossman, The California Supreme Court Rules in Favor of Marriage for Same-Sex 
Couples: Why Domestic Partnerships Are Not Enough: Part One in a Two-Part Series of 
Columns, FINDLAW (May 27, 2008), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/grossman/20080527. 
html; and Linda C. McClain & Joanna Grossman, The California Supreme Court Rules in 
Favor of Marriage for Same-Sex Couples: How Conservative Reasons Led to a Progressive 
Result: Part Two in a Two-Part Series of Columns, FINDLAW (May 28, 2008), http://writ. 
news.findlaw.com/grossman/20080528.html. 
1 RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS (2010); Justice for Hedgehogs: A 
Conference on Ronald Dworkin’s Forthcoming Book, 90 B.U. L. REV. 465 (2010). 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1939978
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topic is Michael Sandel’s recent book, Justice: What’s the Right Thing to Do?2  
We think Sandel chose the more intelligible title!  But we do have a quibble 
with it.  The title, Justice: What’s the Right Thing to Do?, implies that Sandel’s 
work is a book about personal ethics, how one ought to live one’s life.  In fact, 
it is a book about political philosophy, what we owe one another as citizens.  A 
better title would be “Justice: What Do We Owe Each Other as Citizens?”  
Dworkin, alongside John Rawls, is the leading contemporary proponent of a 
liberal conception of justice.3  As Sandel interprets these liberals, they think 
about justice in terms of respecting freedom as distinguished from maximizing 
welfare or cultivating virtues.4  Sandel himself is the leading civic republican 
critic of such liberal conceptions of justice, interpreting them as holding that: 
(1) law should be neutral concerning competing conceptions of virtue or the 
best way to live, and (2) “a just society respects each person’s freedom to 
choose his or her conception of the good life.”5  And he is the most prominent 
civic republican proponent of conceiving justice in terms of cultivating virtues.  
Nonetheless, we want to begin by pointing out some notable and unexpected 
affinities between Dworkin’s and Sandel’s books on justice. 
First, in Justice for Hedgehogs, Dworkin rejects neutrality and criticizes 
Rawls’s political liberalism for bracketing conceptions of the good life in 
arguments about justice.6  Instead, Dworkin defends an ethical liberalism and 
argues for the integration of ethics, morality, and justice.7  So, too, Sandel 
criticizes Rawls’s political liberalism on similar grounds and argues that we 
cannot separate arguments about justice from arguments about competing 
conceptions of the good life and of the virtues that a good society should 
promote.8  Second, in Justice for Hedgehogs, Dworkin is concerned to 
articulate the right process of moral reasoning.9  In doing so, Dworkin looks 
back to Aristotle for an example of a holistic approach to such reasoning and 
also looks to the relationship between questions of the good life and those of 
the good polity.10  So, too, Sandel turns to Aristotle for a virtue-centered 
approach that integrates moral reasoning about justice with reasoning about 
moral virtues and conceptions of the good life.11 
 
2 MICHAEL J. SANDEL, JUSTICE: WHAT’S THE RIGHT THING TO DO? (2009). 
3 See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 3-4 (rev. ed. 1999); JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL 
LIBERALISM xiv (expanded ed. 2005) [hereinafter RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM]. 
4 SANDEL, supra note 2, at 6-10, 19-21, 140-66. 
5 Id. at 9. 
6 DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 263-64, 267-68. 
7 Id. at 1-19, 117-20. 
8 SANDEL, supra note 2, at 140-66, 246-51. 
9 DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 155. 
10 Id. at 186-88. 
11 SANDEL, supra note 2, at 9, 12, 184-207. 
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Third, in Justice for Hedgehogs, Dworkin develops what he once called a 
narrative view of life.12  Sandel has long criticized views like Dworkin’s as 
forms of “voluntarist” liberalism that conceive the person as a freely choosing, 
“unencumbered self” who is the “author” of his or her own ends and who can 
stand apart from relationships and commitments.13  Yet in Justice, Sandel, like 
Dworkin, stresses the importance of a “narrative quest that aspires to a certain 
unity or coherence.”14  But Sandel draws his account of narrative from 
Alasdair MacIntyre; Sandel’s account is more resonant with the notion of the 
embedded self, or the self constituted by relationships with others and 
commitments of communities of which we are members.15  We are, Sandel 
contends, “storytelling beings” and “we live our lives as narrative quests.”16  
Perhaps we can encapsulate the difference here by saying that for Dworkin, we 
conceive ourselves as the authors of our stories, whereas for Sandel, we see 
ourselves as players in a story we tell. 
Finally, in Justice for Hedgehogs, Dworkin argues not only for “taking 
rights seriously,” but also for “taking responsibilities seriously.”17  Dworkin 
stands in contrast to other forms of liberalism grounded in the idea that the 
state must be neutral between competing conceptions of the good life and the 
idea that rights insulate right-holders from moral judgments about their 
exercise.  Rather, Dworkin argues that the state may encourage people to 
exercise their rights responsibly, short of compelling them to do what the 
government thinks is the responsible thing to do.18  Sandel, much like 
 
12 In the penultimate draft of the book, Dworkin referred to a “narrative view of life.”  
Ronald Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs 144 (April 17, 2009) (unpublished manuscript) (on 
file with the Boston University Law Review).  In the published book, he deleted the phrase 
“narrative view of life” and developed the idea in terms of the “capacity principle,” stating 
that “living well means creating not just a chronology but a narrative that weaves together 
values of character – loyalties, ambitions, desires, tastes, and ideals.”  DWORKIN, supra note 
1, at 244.  
13 See MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 89-94, 175-83 (2d ed. 
1998) [hereinafter SANDEL, LIBERALISM] (criticizing conception of the “unencumbered 
self”); Michael J. Sandel, Moral Argument and Liberal Toleration: Abortion and 
Homosexuality, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 521, 522-25, 538 (1989) [hereinafter Sandel, Moral 
Argument] (criticizing liberal conceptions of autonomy as reflecting a “voluntarist” 
conception of the self). 
14 SANDEL, supra note 2, at 221. 
15 Id. at 221-22. 
16 Id. at 221 (citing ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 201 (1981)). 
17 See James E. Fleming, Taking Responsibilities as Well as Rights Seriously, 90 B.U. L. 
REV. 839, 839, 844 (2010) (analyzing RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION (1993), and 
DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS, supra note 1); Ronald Dworkin, Response, 90 B.U. L. 
REV. 1059, 1078-79 (2010) (indicating that Dworkin carries forward the arguments about 
taking responsibilities seriously from Life’s Dominion to Justice for Hedgehogs). 
18 Fleming, supra note 17, at 839-40. 
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Dworkin, has criticized those very liberal conceptions of neutrality and of 
rights as insulating right-holders from moral judgments.19   
And so, we must ask, are Dworkin’s ethical liberalism and Sandel’s civic 
republicanism as far apart as Sandel’s criticisms of liberal conceptions of 
justice might lead us to expect?  One might hypothesize that Sandel is right in 
his criticisms of liberalism, and that Dworkin’s movement in Sandel’s 
direction confirms the validity of his criticisms.  Or, one might hypothesize 
that Sandel is wrong about liberalism, and that Dworkin’s form of ethical 
liberalism shows that Sandel’s criticisms are not well-taken.  We assume that 
Sandel would prefer the former hypothesis!  And we are certain that some 
liberals would insist on the latter.  Our aim here is not to adjudicate this matter, 
but merely to bring out some striking convergences between Dworkin’s and 
Sandel’s books on justice. 
More generally, in what follows, we want to suggest that the contrasts 
between justice as respecting freedom and justice as cultivating virtues are not 
as stark as Sandel has put them.  The work of some liberal political theorists, 
most prominently William Galston and Stephen Macedo, has narrowed the 
distance between these two conceptions.  These theorists have developed 
attractive conceptions of civic liberalism, arguing persuasively that liberalism 
has a proper concern with cultivating civic virtues.20  We too are working on 
this terrain of civic liberalism in our book in progress, entitled Rights, 
Responsibilities, and Virtues.21  This piece figures in that larger project. 
I. THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY IN SANDEL’S PRIOR WORK 
In previous work, we have engaged with Sandel’s prior work concerning the 
form that constitutional interpretation should take in the face of moral 
disagreement and political conflict about basic liberties, such as the right to 
privacy or autonomy.22  Sandel argued that in interpreting constitutional 
freedoms like privacy, courts should move beyond liberal autonomy arguments 
about protecting individual choices to republican moral arguments about 
 
19 Sandel, Moral Argument, supra note 13, at 533-38. 
20 See WILLIAM A. GALSTON, LIBERAL PLURALISM: THE IMPLICATIONS OF VALUE 
PLURALISM FOR POLITICAL THEORY AND PRACTICE 3 (2002); WILLIAM A. GALSTON, LIBERAL 
PURPOSES: GOODS, VIRTUES, AND DIVERSITY IN THE LIBERAL STATE 3 (1991); STEPHEN 
MACEDO, DIVERSITY AND DISTRUST: CIVIC EDUCATION IN A MULTICULTURAL DEMOCRACY 8-
10 (2003); STEPHEN MACEDO, LIBERAL VIRTUES: CITIZENSHIP, VIRTUE, AND COMMUNITY IN 
LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 3-8 (1990). 
21 JAMES E. FLEMING & LINDA C. MCCLAIN, RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND VIRTUES 
(forthcoming) (on file with authors). 
22 JAMES E. FLEMING, SECURING CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY: THE CASE OF AUTONOMY 
141-60 (2006); Linda C. McClain & James E. Fleming, In Search of a Substantive Republic, 
76 TEX. L. REV. 509, 518-22 (1997) (reviewing, in part, MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S 
DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY (1996)). 
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fostering substantive human goods or virtues.23  For this reason, Sandel was 
critical not only of the majority opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick24 for refusing 
to recognize homosexuals’ right to privacy in their intimate associations, but 
also of the dissenting opinions by Justices Blackmun and Stevens for making 
liberal arguments sounding in choice and toleration rather than republican 
arguments sounding in moral goods.25  Furthermore, Sandel argues that, in 
Lawrence v. Texas,26 the Supreme Court should have justified protecting 
homosexuals’ right to privacy not on the basis of homosexuals’ freedom to 
make personal choices, but on the ground of the goods or virtues fostered by 
homosexuals’ intimate associations.27  
Unlike some liberals, who reject out of hand Sandel’s call for a civic 
republicanism that engages in substantive moral argument, we argued that in a 
liberal republican constitutional democracy such as our own it is appropriate to 
make both liberal autonomy arguments and civic republican virtue 
arguments.28  Accordingly, we argued that Sandel overstates the supposed 
dichotomy between the liberal appeal to choice and the republican appeal to 
moral goods.29  And we cautioned against his call for substantive moral 
argument to the extent that it, on the one hand, would jettison liberal 
commitments to toleration and autonomy and, on the other hand, would require 
more ambitious moral argument than seems likely to be successful in 
circumstances of deep moral disagreement and political conflict.30 
Subsequent to our initial criticism of Sandel’s analysis of the right of 
privacy as championed in the dissents of Justices Blackmun and Stevens in 
Bowers, we readily acknowledge that constitutional discourse, especially that 
concerning gay and lesbian rights, has moved in Sandel’s direction.  In Romer 
v. Evans31 the Supreme Court struck down, as a denial of equal protection, an 
amendment to a state constitution prohibiting measures that would protect 
homosexuals against discrimination.32  The Court held that the amendment was 
not rationally related to any legitimate governmental purpose but instead 
reflected “animus” or a “bare desire to harm a politically unpopular group.”33  
 
23 Sandel, Moral Argument, supra note 13, at 521-22. 
24 478 U.S. 186, 190-96 (1986). 
25 Sandel, Moral Argument, supra note 13, at 529-31, 533-39 (criticizing not only the 
majority opinion of Justice White in Bowers, but also the dissenting opinions of Justices 
Blackmun and Stevens). 
26 539 U.S. 558, 564-79 (2003). 
27 MICHAEL J. SANDEL, PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY: ESSAYS ON MORALITY IN POLITICS 142 
(2005). 
28 FLEMING, supra note 22, at 154-60; McClain & Fleming, supra note 22, at 530-38. 
29 McClain & Fleming, supra note 22, at 530. 
30 Id. at 530-35.  
31 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
32 Id. at 635-36. 
33 Id. at 632, 634 (quoting Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)). 
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In a vigorous dissent, Justice Scalia implicitly paid Sandel a backhanded 
compliment when he complained that gay and lesbian rights advocates seek 
“not merely a grudging social toleration, but full social acceptance, of 
homosexuality.”34  Sandel, in his critique of the liberal dissents in Bowers, had 
advocated moving beyond arguments for empty toleration to arguments for 
acceptance and appreciation of gays and lesbians.35 
Several years after Romer, in Lawrence, the Supreme Court held that a state 
law criminalizing same-sex sodomy violated a homosexual’s right to privacy 
or autonomy.36  Justice Kennedy’s opinion declared that it “demeans the lives” 
of homosexuals to respect the right of heterosexuals to autonomy without 
respecting an analogous right for homosexuals.37  One of us (Fleming) did “a 
Sandel” on Kennedy’s opinion,38 going through the opinion and single-
mindedly differentiating the liberal strains from the republican strains.   
Let us say that the liberal elements bespeak concern for choice, 
autonomy, toleration, and bracketing moral arguments and disagreement, 
while the republican elements bespeak concern for justifying freedoms on 
the basis of substantive moral arguments about the goods or virtues they 
promote, or on the basis of their significance for citizenship.39   
My analysis showed that Lawrence reflects an intertwining of liberal and 
republican concerns, emphasizing respecting autonomy together with securing 
the status of free and equal citizenship for all.40  I argued that my liberal 
republican constitutional theory “is tailor made to fit and to support arguments 
and decisions weaving together such strands.”41  By contrast, Sandel’s civic 
republican theory seems to call for substantive moral arguments to the 
exclusion of liberal autonomy or toleration arguments.42  
In Sandel’s own analysis of Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Lawrence, he too 
begins by identifying the liberal autonomy arguments sounding in choice.43  
But, Sandel clearly was heartened by Kennedy’s opinion.  For, according to 
Sandel, Kennedy’s opinion not only embodied liberal strands of choice, but 
also “gestured toward” republican strands of moral goods, specifically that the 
 
34 Id. at 646 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
35 Sandel, Moral Argument, supra note 13, at 533-38.  For an elaboration of the contrast 
between “empty toleration” and “toleration as respect,” see Linda C. McClain, Toleration, 
Autonomy, and Governmental Promotion of Good Lives: Beyond “Empty” Toleration to 
Toleration as Respect, 59 OHIO ST. L. J. 19 (1998). 
36 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578-79 (2003). 
37 Id. at 575, 578. 
38 I coined this term – “a Sandel” – with the greatest appreciation and respect for Michael 
Sandel.  See FLEMING, supra note 22, at 154-60. 
39 Id. at 154-55. 
40 Id. at 160. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. at 154-60; McClain & Fleming, supra note 22, at 530-38.  
43 SANDEL, supra note 27, at 142. 
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statute “wrongly demeaned a morally legitimate mode of life.”44  Yet, Sandel’s 
analysis implies that Kennedy’s opinion would have been still more persuasive 
if it had been cast more fully in terms of republican moral goods along the 
lines he urges. 
Goodridge v. Department of Public Health,45 the decision of the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court recognizing a right to same-sex 
marriage under the state constitution, may be the fullest realization in a judicial 
opinion to date of Sandel’s call for substantive moral arguments in justifying 
constitutional rights.  Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion spoke of the moral 
goods of marriage, most centrally “commitment,” but also “the ideals of 
mutuality, companionship, intimacy, fidelity, and family.”46  But we hasten to 
add that, even in Goodridge, republican arguments sounding in moral goods 
stand side by side with liberal arguments sounding in choice, autonomy, and 
toleration (as Sandel acknowledges in his analysis of Goodridge, to be 
discussed below).  Again, we want to suggest that this combination – synthesis 
of liberal arguments with republican arguments – is as it should be in a liberal 
republican constitutional democracy such as our own, and most certainly in 
circumstances of deep moral disagreement and political conflict. 
II. SANDEL’S ARISTOTELIAN CONCEPTION OF JUSTICE IN TERMS OF 
CULTIVATING VIRTUES 
For the rest of this Article, we will examine Sandel’s argument about the 
impossibility of liberal neutrality and the unavoidability of substantive moral 
argument about moral goods and virtues in justifying constitutional rights.  In 
particular, we want to examine one example Sandel offers: the definition of 
marriage and whether gay men and lesbians should be allowed to marry.  We 
will focus on Sandel’s articulation of Aristotle’s method for addressing 
questions of political conflict: an inquiry into office, virtues, and purposes.  
Sandel proposes what he calls a third approach to justice, focusing on 
cultivating virtues instead of maximizing welfare or respecting freedom.  Under 
Sandel’s approach, questions of justice are not just about freedom or welfare 
but also about virtues and higher moral purposes.  We think that Sandel’s 
insight – that what is at stake in the same-sex marriage debate and many other 
conflicts has to do with questions of worth and status – is quite powerful.47  
His reliance on Aristotle as an exemplar of a virtue approach to justice is also 
very helpful.  We will consider to what extent Sandel’s conception is 
compatible with the constitutional liberal approach to the relationship among 
 
44 Id. 
45 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
46 Id. at 954. 
47
“Challenged by the insights of Michael Sandel,” Chai Feldblum advocates 
“judgmental moral arguments” in support of marriage equality for same-sex couples.  Chai 
R. Feldblum, Gay is Good: The Moral Case for Marriage Equality and More, 17 YALE J.L. 
& FEMINISM 139, 157, 159 (2005). 
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rights, responsibilities, and virtues that we are developing in our book in 
progress. 
Let us begin by sketching Sandel’s presentation of Aristotle’s conception of 
justice in terms of cultivating virtues.  Sandel asserts:  
Debates about justice and rights are often, unavoidably, debates about the 
purposes of social institutions, the goods they allocate, and the virtues 
they honor and reward.  Despite our best attempts to make law neutral on 
such questions, it may not be possible to say what’s just without arguing 
about the nature of the good life.48  
Aristotle’s approach to justice, as Sandel recounts, has two central ideas: 
1.  Justice is teleological: Defining rights requires us to figure out the 
telos (the purpose, end, or essential nature) of the social practice in 
question. 
2.  Justice is honorific: To reason about the telos of a practice – or to 
argue about it – is, at least in part, to reason or argue about what virtues it 
should honor and reward.49  
This approach, Sandel argues, differs from “[m]odern theories of justice,” 
because the latter “try to separate questions of fairness and rights from 
arguments about honor, virtue, and moral desert.  They seek principles of 
justice that are neutral among ends, and enable people to choose and pursue 
their ends for themselves.”50  By contrast, Aristotle views questions of justice 
as “unavoidably” bound up with “debates about honor, virtue, and the nature of 
the good life.”51  Justice, for Aristotle, “means giving people what they 
deserve, giving each person his or her due.”52  
Thus, Sandel sets up a dichotomy between a liberal conception of justice as 
respecting rights and an Aristotelian view of justice as being concerned with 
forming good citizens.  “For Aristotle, the purpose of politics is not to set up a 
framework of rights that is neutral among ends.  It is to form good citizens and 
to cultivate good character.”53  Aristotle, in a passage Sandel quotes, criticizes 
a political association that merely was “a guarantor of men’s rights against one 
another” for being a “mere covenant” or “mere alliance,” instead of “being, as 
it should be, a rule of life such as will make the members of a polis good and 
just.”54  Sandel concludes that the “highest end of political association” for 
Aristotle, “is to cultivate the virtue of citizens;” “politics is about something 
higher” than promoting economic exchange or maximizing economic 
 
48 SANDEL, supra note 2, at 207. 
49 Id. at 186. 
50 Id. at 187. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 193. 
54 Id. (quoting ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS, Book III, ch. ix, 1282b (Ernest Barker trans. & 
ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1946)). 
 2011] RESPECTING FREEDOM AND CULTIVATING VIRTUES 1319 
 
welfare.55  “It’s about learning how to live a good life.”56  Another implication 
is that the institutions of social life should be means to the end of the good life. 
We reject this dichotomy; our project is to develop a civic liberalism that 
both supports rights and underwrites a formative project of inculcating civic 
virtues of liberal citizenship.  We, like other civic liberals such as Galston and 
Macedo, are indebted to Sandel for inspiring us to think about a liberal 
constitutionalism’s proper formative project.  In the remainder of this Article, 
we will elaborate some points of disagreement with Sandel.  As in our prior 
work analyzing Sandel, we will argue that it is not necessary to take an 
either/or approach: making arguments sounding either in protecting freedom 
of choice or in promoting moral goods.  We should combine both types of 
argument. 
III. NOT ONLY NEUTRAL BUT ALSO NAKED: THE LIBERAL IDEA OF PUBLIC 
REASON 
Sandel argues that liberalism aspires not merely to state neutrality 
concerning competing conceptions of the good life, but indeed to a naked 
public square denuded of religious arguments and convictions.57  Here he 
criticizes Rawls’s idea of public reason and conception of the Supreme Court 
as an exemplar of public reason.58  Sandel quotes Rawls as providing this test 
for whether we are following public reason: “[H]ow would our argument strike 
us presented in the form of a supreme court opinion?”59  Rawls continues: 
“The justices cannot, of course, invoke their own personal morality, nor the 
ideals and virtues of morality generally.  Those they must view as irrelevant.  
Equally, they cannot invoke their or other people’s religious or philosophical 
views.”60  Interpreting Rawls, Sandel concludes: “Like Supreme Court justices, 
we should set aside our moral and religious convictions, and restrict ourselves 
to arguments that all citizens can reasonably be expected to accept.”61  
President John F. Kennedy accepted this ideal of liberal neutrality, Sandel 
argues, but President Barack Obama rejects it.62  Sandel asserts that “[f]rom 
the 1960s through the 1980s, Democrats drifted toward the neutrality ideal, and 
largely banished moral and religious argument from their political discourse,” 
with Martin Luther King, Jr., and Robert Kennedy being the exceptions.63  By 
 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. at 248. 
58 Id. at 249-51.  Rawls uses the formulation “exemplar of public reason.”  RAWLS, 
POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 3, at 236. 
59 SANDEL, supra note 2, at 249 (quoting RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 3, at 
31). 
60 Id. at 249 (quoting RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 3, at 236). 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 249-50. 
63 Id. at 249. 
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contrast, the religious right, beginning in the 1980s with the election of Ronald 
Reagan and the launching of the Christian Coalition, sought to “clothe the 
‘naked public square’” and attack the moral permissiveness of American life.64  
Liberal and Democratic response was anemic, Sandel charges; even when 
liberals spoke about “values,” they did so awkwardly and typically meant “the 
values of tolerance, fairness, and freedom of choice.”65  Here, Sandel’s 
example is John Kerry’s 2004 convention acceptance speech.66  Obama is the 
hero of this story, with Sandel quoting at length from an Obama speech about 
how “thousands of Americans” are coming to realize that:  
[S]omething is missing . . . .  They want a sense of purpose, a narrative 
arc to their lives. . . .  [I]f we truly hope to speak to people where they’re 
at – to communicate our hopes and values in a way that’s relevant to their 
own – then as progressives, we cannot abandon the field of religious 
discourse.67 
Sandel concludes, after excerpting this speech: 
Obama’s claim that progressives should embrace a more capacious, faith-
friendly form of public reason reflects a sound political instinct.  It is also 
good political philosophy.  The attempt to detach arguments about justice 
and rights from arguments about the good life is mistaken for two 
reasons: First, it is not always possible to decide questions of justice and 
rights without resolving substantive moral questions; and second, even 
where it’s possible, it may not be desirable.68 
This serves as Sandel’s springboard to considering several controversial 
“culture war” issues: the abortion and stem cell debates and the same-sex 
marriage debate.69  We have sketched Sandel’s criticism of the idea of public 
reason, not to assess it in its own right – we will leave that undertaking to 
Hugh Baxter’s article in this symposium70 – but to set the stage for our 
discussion of Sandel’s analysis of same-sex marriage. 
IV. SANDEL’S ANALYSIS OF GOODRIDGE, THE MASSACHUSETTS SAME-SEX 
MARRIAGE DECISION 
Sandel argues that the question of whether to recognize same-sex marriage 
cannot be resolved within the bounds of liberal public reason, but instead 
requires “recourse to controversial conceptions of the purpose of marriage and 
 
64 Id. at 250 (quoting RICHARD NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE (1984)). 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. (quoting Barack Obama, Keynote Address at Call to Renewal Conference (June 28, 
2006), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/28/us/politics/2006obamaspeech. 
html). 
68 Id. at 251. 
69 See id. at 251-60. 
70 Hugh Baxter, Sandel on Religion in the Public Square, 91 B.U. L. REV. __ (2011). 
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the goods it honors.”71  Thus, arguments appealing to “liberal, nonjudgmental 
grounds [–] whether one personally approves or disapproves of gay and lesbian 
relationships, individuals should be free to choose their marital partners” – will 
not suffice.72  Whether gay men and lesbians should be allowed to enter into 
civil marriage, Sandel argues, depends on arguments about the purpose of the 
social institution of marriage, which means that we must argue about “the 
virtues it honors and rewards.”73  He asserts: “The debate over same-sex 
marriage is fundamentally a debate about whether gay and lesbian unions are 
worthy of the honor and recognition that, in our society, state-sanctioned 
marriage confers.  So the underlying question is unavoidable.”74 
Sandel argues this is so because the state may choose among three different 
policies concerning marriage:  
1. Recognize only marriages between a man and a woman.  
2. Recognize same-sex and opposite-sex marriages.  
3. Don’t recognize marriage of any kind, but leave this role to private 
associations.75  
Political theorist Tamara Metz has referred to this third option as “the 
disestablishing of marriage,” by analogy to the disestablishment of religion.76  
For completeness, we should round out these three with a modification of the 
first position, which we will call Policy 4: restrict marriage to opposite-sex 
couples, but create a parallel institution, whether domestic partnership or civil 
union, for same-sex couples.  Sandel notes that several states have done this, 
but he doesn’t list it among the policy options.77 
What about Policy 3, disestablishment of marriage?  Even though it is 
“purely hypothetical” and hardly anyone has embraced this proposal, Sandel 
claims, it “sheds light on the arguments for and against same-sex marriage.”78  
How so?  It is a “libertarian solution” to the marriage debate because it 
“privatizes marriage,”79 letting people marry as they please, without state 
sanction or interference.  To the extent that the controversy over altering the 
definition of civil marriage entails religious disputes about marriage’s purpose, 
this policy would allow the state to bypass such controversies by leaving the 
definition of marriage to religious entities.  Under Policy 3, what role would 
the state have instead?  Proposals vary.  Liberal Michael Kinsley, for example, 
 
71 SANDEL, supra note 2, at 253. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 253-54. 
74 Id. at 254. 
75 Id. 
76 TAMARA METZ, UNTYING THE KNOT: MARRIAGE, THE STATE, AND THE CASE FOR THEIR 
DIVORCE 113-14, 119-20 (2010). 
77 SANDEL, supra note 2, at 254. 
78 Id. at 254-55. 
79 Id. at 255 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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suggests that the state could provide domestic partnership laws to address 
economic and inheritance aspects of marriage.80  Feminist Martha Fineman 
suggests that the economic subsidies now tied to marriage could be shifted to 
the caretaker/dependent relationship, stressing that adult intimate relationships 
could be handled by private contract.81  Similarly, liberal feminist Tamara 
Metz argues for a new status, an Intimate Caregiving Union.82  She reasons 
that this would get at the state’s most significant contemporary interest in 
intimate relationships: intimate caregiving, and ensuring that dependency and 
vulnerability are addressed in fair and just ways.83  But this new status, Metz 
argues, would avoid the problem that now exists with state establishment of 
marriage: because marriage is a comprehensive social institution, whose social 
meaning and ethical authority stem from extra-governmental sources such as 
religion, state regulation offends liberal principles of liberty, equality, and 
stability.84   
Sandel relates the disestablishment argument to the Aristotelian virtue 
framework: “Since the state would no longer confer on any family units the 
honorific title of marriage, citizens would be able to avoid engaging in debate 
about the telos of marriage, and whether gays and lesbians can fulfill it.”85  
Moreover, liberal neutrality would get a boost because this solution “does not 
require judges or citizens to engage in the moral and religious controversy over 
the purpose of marriage and the morality of homosexuality.”86  Sandel 
contends that considering Policy 3 shows us that neither Policy 1 nor Policy 2 
can be defended within “the bounds of liberal public reason”; considering the 
disestablishment proposal helps us see, he contends, “why both proponents and 
opponents of same-sex marriage must contend with the substantive moral and 
religious controversy about the purpose of marriage and the goods that define 
it.”87  
Looking at the arguments on both sides of the issue bears out Sandel’s 
contentions to a degree.  Thus, he observes that opponents of same-sex 
marriage argue that “the true meaning” of marriage would be dishonored by 
altering marriage’s definition and they are not “bashful about the fact that 
they’re making a moral or religious claim.”88  This is Sandel’s contention, but 
we would point out that the arguments that opponents of same-sex marriage 
make in court generally eschew religious language and appeal to grounds like 
 
80 Michael Kinsley, Abolish Marriage: Let’s really get the government out of our 
bedrooms, WASH. POST, July 3, 2003, at A23. 
81 MARTHA FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF DEPENDENCY 123 (2004). 
82 METZ, supra note 76, at 119-27. 
83 Id. at 124-26. 
84 Id. at 114-19. 
85 SANDEL, supra note 2, at 256. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
88 Id.. 
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marriage’s procreative purpose, optimal childrearing for children, and the 
importance of preserving tradition.89  By contrast, proponents of a right to 
same-sex marriage, he says, “often try to rest their claim on neutral grounds, 
and to avoid passing judgment on the moral meaning of marriage.  The attempt 
to find a nonjudgmental case for same-sex marriage draws heavily on the ideas 
of nondiscrimination and freedom of choice.”90  But nondiscrimination and 
freedom of choice alone, he argues, are not enough to justify a right to same-
sex marriage.91  Here he turns to Goodridge to explain why. 
Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in Goodridge, Sandel observes, begins with 
a disclaimer – adapted from the Supreme Court in Casey and Lawrence – about 
the court not taking sides in the dispute among competing moral, religious, and 
ethical convictions about marriage and about whether same-sex couples are 
entitled to marry.92  Marshall quotes Lawrence (itself quoting Casey): “Our 
obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral code.”93  
So far, this sounds like a liberal analysis: the right to marry is a matter of 
autonomy and freedom of choice; to exclude same-sex couples denies them 
“respect for individual autonomy and equality under law.”94  In Sandel’s gloss, 
Marshall is saying that the issue “is not the moral worth of the choice, but the 
right of the individual to make it.”95 
But those grounds are insufficient, Sandel contends: if the state were truly 
neutral, how could it draw any lines at all about who may marry, so long as the 
relationships were voluntary?96  On what grounds could it prohibit polygamy?  
He goes so far as to suggest that if the state truly wanted to be neutral, it would 
 
89 See, e.g., Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 930-32 (N.D. Cal. 2010) 
(observing that, by contrast to arguments that proponents of Proposition 8 made in the 
official campaign to pass it, which “conveyed to voters that same-sex relationships are 
inferior to opposite-sex relationships and dangerous to children,” in the litigation over 
Proposition 8, proponents stressed that Proposition 8 promoted marriage’s “central purpose” 
of promoting naturally procreative relationships and promoted “‘statistically optimal’ child-
rearing households; that is, households in which children are raised by a man and a woman 
married to each other”).  Prominent conservative opponents may also eschew religious 
arguments out of court.  See Sherif Girgis, Robert P. George & Ryan T. Anderson, What Is 
Marriage?, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 245, 247 (2010) (contending that their argument for 
“legally enshrining” the “conjugal view of marriage” requires “no appeal to religious 
authority”). 
90 SANDEL, supra note 2, at 256. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. at 257 (quoting Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 
2003) (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571 (2003) (quoting Planned Parenthood 
of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992)))). 
94 Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 949. 
95 SANDEL, supra note 2, at 257. 
96 Id. 
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have to “get out of the business of conferring recognition on any marriages” 
(recall Policy 3 above).97 
Instead, Sandel argues, “[t]he real issue in the gay marriage debate is not 
freedom of choice but whether same-sex unions are worthy of honor and 
recognition by the community – whether they fulfill the purpose of the social 
institution of marriage.”  He continues: “In Aristotle’s terms, the issue is the 
just distribution of offices and honors.  It’s a matter of social recognition.”98 
Sandel finds in Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion a nodding toward this view 
of the matter.  For example, in noting that the state is a third party to every 
marriage, Marshall brings out marriage’s “honorific aspect”: “Civil marriage is 
at once a deeply personal commitment to another human being and a highly 
public celebration of the ideals of mutuality, companionship, intimacy, fidelity, 
and family.”99  Here, Sandel argues, she “steps outside the bounds of liberal 
neutrality to affirm the moral worth of same-sex unions, and to offer a view 
about the purpose of marriage, properly conceived.”100  What virtues or goods 
does marriage honor, if it is “an honorific institution”?101  Sandel notes that 
many opponents of same-sex marriage argue that the purpose of marriage is 
procreation, and that since same-sex couples lack the natural capacity to 
procreate, they lack “the relevant virtue.”102  Marshall directly addresses and 
rejects this argument, locating marriage’s primary purpose – its sine qua non – 
not in procreation, but in an “exclusive, loving commitment between two 
partners.”103 
Sandel next stands back to ask: “[H]ow . . . is it possible to adjudicate 
between rival accounts of the purpose, or essence, of marriage?”104  Is it 
“simply a clash of bald assertions” or is there some way to show that one 
argument is more plausible than the other?105  Marshall’s opinion, he suggests, 
provides a “good illustration” of how to proceed in such cases of conflict.106  
Her method, he suggests, entails “an interpretation of the purpose or essence of 
marriage as it currently exists.”107  She shows that “as currently practiced and 
regulated by the state, [marriage] does not require the ability to procreate.”108  
From this, Sandel extrapolates: if there are “rival interpretations of a social 
 
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 257-58. 
99 Id. at 258 (quoting Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 954). 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. at 258-59. 
104 Id. at 259. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. 
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practice, . . . how can we determine which is more plausible?”109  He identifies 
two ways.  One way is “to ask which account makes better sense of existing 
marriage laws, taken as a whole.  Another is to ask which interpretation of 
marriage celebrates virtues worth honoring.”110  Put another way, to determine 
“[w]hat counts as the purpose of marriage” necessitates an inquiry about “what 
qualities we think marriage should celebrate and affirm.”111  This, he 
concludes, leads unavoidably to the “underlying moral and religious 
controversy”: “What is the moral status of gay and lesbian relationships?”112  
On this question of moral status, Sandel argues, Marshall’s opinion is not 
neutral, but concludes that the relationships formed by gay men and lesbians 
are as worthy of respect as opposite-sex relationships.113  When the state denies 
same-sex couples the right to marry, it (quoting Marshall) “confers an official 
stamp of approval on the destructive stereotype that same-sex relationships are 
inherently unstable and inferior to opposite-sex relationships and are not 
worthy of respect.”114  Thus, concludes Sandel:  
[W]hen we look closely at the case for same-sex marriage, we find that it 
cannot rest on the ideas of nondiscrimination and freedom of choice.  In 
order to decide who should qualify for marriage, we have to think through 
the purpose of marriage and the virtues it honors.  And this carries us onto 
contested moral terrain, where we can’t remain neutral toward competing 
conceptions of the good life.115 
Sandel’s analysis is illuminating in important ways, but problematic in 
setting up an either/or dichotomy between nondiscrimination and freedom of 
choice, on the one hand, and virtues and purposes, on the other.  We would 
insist that the case for same-sex marriage does properly rest in part on “ideas 
of nondiscrimination and freedom of choice.”116  Sandel is right, though, to 
insist that it also entails inquiry into the purposes of marriage and requires 
interpreting marriage as a contemporary social institution. 
But we want to point out that one can offer an alternative reading of 
Goodridge that does not require recourse to distinctively moral goods, much 
less Aristotelian teleological moral analysis, and that does not go outside the 
bounds of liberalism.  First, conventional constitutional law doctrine 
concerning Due Process (liberty) and Equal Protection, both federal and state, 
requires an inquiry into whether laws that are challenged are rationally related 
 
109 Id. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. at 259-60. 
112 Id. at 260. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. (quoting Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 962 (Mass. 2003)). 
115 Id. 
116 Id. 
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to a legitimate governmental purpose or end.117  The analysis of purposes or 
ends required in these contexts is not peculiarly Aristotelian or teleological nor 
is it necessarily a moral inquiry.  And there is nothing about liberalism that 
precludes this conventional inquiry.  To the contrary, basic principles of liberal 
legitimacy require such an inquiry.  If a law is not rationally related to a 
legitimate governmental purpose or end, it is not a legitimate exercise of 
political power in the most elemental sense.  And, under conventional 
constitutional law doctrine, it is not constitutional.  This general requirement 
extends far beyond the “culture war” issues like same-sex marriage implicating 
moral disagreement and political conflict.  It applies to analyses of purposes or 
ends that are not moral in any ordinary sense.118 
Second, the conclusions that laws criminalizing same-sex sodomy “demean 
the existence” of gays and lesbians119 or that laws limiting marriage to 
opposite-sex couples “confer[] an official stamp of approval on the destructive 
stereotype that same-sex relationships are inherently unstable and inferior to 
opposite-sex relationships and are not worthy of respect”120 are not necessarily 
Aristotelian and are not off limits to liberalism.  One can interpret these 
holdings in Dworkinian terms: that the challenged laws deny equal concern 
and respect.121  Alternatively, one can put them in characteristically liberal 
terms as denials of dignity.  That is how the Court of Appeal for Ontario put it 
in Halpern v. Toronto: “[T]he existing common law definition of marriage”122 
“offends the dignity of persons in same-sex relationships.”123  And that is how 
Dworkin argues for a right to same-sex marriage.124  That is also how the 
California Supreme Court framed its decision striking down a law limiting 
marriage to opposite-sex couples (as we will show below).125  What is more, 
one can frame these conclusions in terms of a Rawlsian liberal concern to 
secure the status of free and equal citizenship for all,126 homosexuals and 
heterosexuals alike.  From this standpoint, one can condemn the laws at issue 
in Lawrence and Goodridge for denying gays and lesbians this status by 
demeaning their existence, by denying the equal moral worth of their 
relationships, or by failing to accord them the common benefits of citizenship.  
 
117 See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 540 
(3d ed. 2006) (federal doctrine); Goodridge, 798 N.E. 2d at 960 (state doctrine). 
118 See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955). 
119 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). 
120 Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 962 (2003). 
121 See RONALD DWORKIN, IS DEMOCRACY POSSIBLE HERE? PRINCIPLES FOR A NEW 
POLITICAL DEBATE 72-73 (2006) (interpreting Lawrence); id. at 86-89 (arguing for a right to 
same-sex marriage). 
122 [2003] 172 O.A.C. 276, para. 148. 
123 Id. at para. 107. 
124 DWORKIN, supra note 121, at 86-89. 
125 See infra Part V. 
126 See RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 3, at 335. 
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In short, all of these formulations comfortably express political liberalism’s 
aspiration to secure the common and guaranteed status of free and equal 
citizenship to all.  There is nothing in political liberalism that precludes such 
formulations.  To the contrary, political liberalism requires these conclusions. 
Finally, despite Sandel’s suggestions, there is nothing in these formulations 
that entails that government is furthering a particular comprehensive 
conception of the good and thus that they are off limits to political liberalism 
or flout political liberalism’s commitment to public reason.  Political liberalism 
as Rawls formulates it precludes government from imposing or promoting a 
particular comprehensive conception of the good,127 for example, that of the 
Catholic Church.  It does not preclude government from pursuing moral goods 
or public values that are common to a number of competing comprehensive 
conceptions – for example, to recall the moral goods Chief Justice Marshall 
invokes in Goodridge: commitment, mutuality, companionship, intimacy, 
fidelity, and family.128  It is one thing to say, as Rawls does, that political 
liberalism rules out governmental imposition of a particular comprehensive 
conception of the good.  It is quite another to say that political liberalism rules 
out governmental creation of institutions like marriage that pursue moral goods 
like those stated above.  It does not.129  Nor does political liberalism preclude 
justifying constitutional rights on the basis of the moral goods promoted by 
protecting them.  
In sum, Sandel provides a powerful and illuminating reading of the 
Goodridge same-sex marriage decision in terms of moral goods and purposes.  
But political and constitutional liberals can and should embrace Chief Justice 
Marshall’s opinion.  Not only does it not exceed the bounds of political 
liberalism or of public reason – it is, in Rawls’s terms, an exemplar of public 
reason. 
V. THE CALIFORNIA MARRIAGE CASES 
Like Goodridge, the recent California cases (both state and federal) 
concerning the definition of marriage provide a valuable opportunity to explore 
 
127 Id. at 37. 
128 Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 954 (Mass. 2003). 
129 Political liberalism holds that “the family is part of the basic structure, since one of its 
main roles is to be the basis of the orderly production and reproduction of society and its 
culture from one generation to the next.”  John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 
64 U. CHI. L. REV. 765, 788 (1997).  In that sense, it recognizes reproduction and social 
reproduction as central tasks carried out by the family.  But Rawls goes on to state that “no 
particular form of the family (monogamous, heterosexual, or otherwise) is required by a 
political conception of justice so long as the family is arranged to fulfill these tasks 
effectively and doesn’t run afoul of other political values.”  Id. at n.60.  Elsewhere, one of us 
builds on this framework and argues that, in addition to carrying out the vital tasks of 
caregiving and social reproduction, families afford the chance to realize the goods of 
intimate association.  LINDA C. MCCLAIN, THE PLACE OF FAMILIES: FOSTERING CAPACITY, 
EQUALITY, AND RESPONSIBILITY 20-21 (2006). 
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the promise of Sandel’s proposed Aristotelian method for resolving the debate 
over same-sex marriage, which foregrounds questions of “competing notions 
of honor and virtue, pride and recognition.”130  At the same time, also like 
Goodridge, they suggest that his dichotomy between a liberal approach and a 
virtue approach is too stark.  Although the success of the ballot initiative 
Proposition 8, amending the California Constitution to define marriage as the 
union between one man and one woman, in effect nullified the California 
Supreme Court decision in In re Marriage Cases, the court’s opinion still 
warrants analysis as an instructive melding of rights and virtues arguments. 
What distinguishes both the state and federal cases in California from prior 
litigation over same-sex marriage is that they raise and thoroughly address the 
question of whether it is constitutional to afford same-sex couples an 
alternative legal status – that of domestic partnership, to which the material 
benefits and the respective rights and responsibilities of marriage attach – 
while reserving the status of marriage exclusively to same-sex couples.  This 
helps to focus attention on what Metz helpfully calls the meaning side of 
marriage, as distinct from the material side.131  It is a new stage in the struggle 
for marriage equality.  Framing the question in this way helps people to hone 
in on the significance of the label “marriage.”  Here Sandel’s intuition that 
what is at stake is questions about worth is helpful: are same-sex unions 
viewed as equally worthy of official recognition as the unions of opposite-sex 
couples?  Or is the creation of an alternative legal status based on a judgment 
that such relationships are inferior and not as worthy?  So, too, these opinions 
afford examples of courts engaging in substantive moral argument and 
interpretive reasoning about the purposes of marriage.  We focus primarily on 
the decision of the California Supreme Court from 2008, In re Marriage 
Cases,132 and then conclude with a mention of the decision of the federal 
district court invalidating Proposition 8, Perry v. Schwarzenegger.133  It is 
necessary briefly to give some background.  
By referendum in a 2000 election, California voters adopted Proposition 22, 
which provides that “Only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or 
recognized in California.”134  Nonetheless, California had become one of the 
most hospitable environments for same-sex couples.  Since the enactment of a 
law in 1999, same-sex partners have been permitted to register with the 
Secretary of State as domestic partners.135  The preamble to California’s 
domestic partner law states its goals: promoting equality for “caring and 
committed couples,” “promoting family relationships and protecting family 
 
130 SANDEL, supra note 2, at 261. 
131 METZ, supra note 76, at 35-37, 41-44. 
132 In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008). 
133 Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010). 
134 Proposition 22 (2000) (codified as CAL. FAM. CODE § 308.5 (2000)), held 
unconstitutional by Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 453. 
135 Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 413. 
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members during life crises,” and reducing “discrimination on the bases of sex 
and sexual orientation.”136  The legislature has steadily expanded the domestic 
partnership law, culminating in the dramatic expansion of the Domestic Partner 
Rights and Responsibilities Act of 2003 (Domestic Partner Act).137  The upshot 
is that, at least since 2005, domestic partnership has functioned in California as 
a near-equivalent to marriage. 
In re Marriage Cases takes up the question of whether the state must go 
further, and provide same-sex couples with access to civil marriage.  In a 
lengthy opinion, authored by Justice Ronald George, the California Supreme 
Court reached two basic conclusions: (1) that the fundamental right to marry 
protected by the state constitution’s due process clause includes the right to 
marry a person of the same sex138 and (2) that reserving the status of marriage 
for heterosexuals, while limiting gays and lesbians to the second-class 
domestic partnership status, constitutes unconstitutional discrimination on the 
basis of sexual orientation in violation of the state constitution’s equal 
protection clause.139  On the face of it, these two holdings seem to correspond 
to what Sandel characterizes as the insufficient arguments of freedom of choice 
and nondiscrimination, respectively.  
Within the small number of states that have granted some kind of formal 
recognition to same-sex couples, there is a divide between those who grant full 
access to marriage and those who create an alternative legal status to provide 
comparable benefits.  Illustrating the latter approach, Vermont’s high court, in 
Baker v. State of Vermont,140 allowed the legislature the discretion to create an 
alternative legal status, civil union, to provide common benefits to same-sex 
couples (although the legislature subsequently in 2009 extended civil marriage 
to same-sex couples).141  So did New Jersey’s high court, in Lewis v. Harris.142  
Illustrating the former approach, Massachusetts’s high court, in an advisory 
opinion subsequent to Goodridge, rebuffed the state Senate when it asked 
whether adopting a civil union law for same-sex couples rather than allowing 
marriage would be sufficient.  The court held that the “dissimilitude between 
the terms ‘civil marriage’ and ‘civil union’ is not innocuous,” but rather 
assigns “same-sex, largely homosexual, couples to second-class status.”143 
The Supreme Court of California joined Massachusetts in believing that the 
name “marriage” – or at least the withholding of the name – means 
 
136 Id. at 414. 
137 Id. at 414-16. 
138 Id. at 446. 
139 Id. at 452. 
140 Baker v. State of Vermont, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999). 
141 Pub. Act No. 3, 2009 Vt. Acts & Resolves 33 (codified in scattered sections of VT. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 15 & 18 (2009)). 
142 Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006). 
143 In re Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 440 Mass. 1201, 1207 (2004). 
 1330 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91: 1311 
 
something.144  According to the majority opinion, the right to marry as 
protected by the state constitution is a “couple’s right to have their family 
relationship accorded dignity and respect equal to that accorded other officially 
recognized families.”145  Making the name of their family relationship turn on 
the identity of the parties undermines that equal dignity and respect.  Perhaps 
the state could, the majority suggests, strip all unions of the name “marriage” 
and call them something else146 – that would be the disestablishment Policy 3 
mentioned above.147  As a matter of both due process and equal protection, 
however, the state may not maintain one status for opposite-sex couples and 
another for same-sex ones.148 
The distinctiveness of the California Supreme Court’s approach is manifest 
when compared with that of New Jersey.  In Lewis v. Harris, the state’s highest 
court said that the naming question does not implicate constitutional questions, 
but is instead best resolved in the “crucible of the democratic process.”149  The 
majority concluded that constitutionally requiring access to “marriage” – rather 
than simply to the rights and responsibilities “of marriage” – would force 
“social acceptance” upon the citizens of New Jersey, who may not be ready for 
it.150  Any change in the longstanding definition of marriage, the majority 
believed, ought to come from the legislature, through “civil dialogue and 
reasoned discourse.”151  This reasoning seems to treat the question of who may 
use the name “marriage” for their relationships as a question of policy, not 
constitutional rights.  By contrast, the California court emphatically stated that 
its role is not to make decisions based on policy or what is popular, but to 
interpret the constitution and to protect rights under it.152 
In addition to marriage’s symbolic importance, the California Supreme 
Court identified other reasons why a two-tier system denies same-sex couples 
equal dignity and respect.  To begin, the entrenched bias against gays and 
lesbians raises special concerns about a separate-but-equal approach.  Drawing 
the analogy to race, the court observed that California’s barring interracial 
marriages would have been unconstitutional even if the state had made unions 
using “alternative nomenclature such as “transracial unions” available to 
interracial couples.153  The court also pointed out the practical problem, evident 
from Vermont’s and New Jersey’s experiences with civil unions, that the 
public understands marriage, but does not understand alternatives like civil 
 
144 See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 398 (Cal. 2008). 
145 Id. at 400; see also id. at 428, 429, 434-35. 
146 Id. at 400. 
147 See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
148 Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 400. 
149 Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 221 (N.J. 2006). 
150 Id. at 223. 
151 Id. at 222. 
152 Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 398-99, 448. 
153 Id. at 435. 
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unions or domestic partnerships.154  Finally, the court identified the risk that 
having separate tracks for opposite-sex and same-sex relationships may send a 
general message that government regards gay men and lesbians and their 
families as less worthy of respect.155 
Thus, questions of worth do play an obvious and important role in the 
court’s opinion.  And the opinion seems to track Sandel’s argument that the 
debate about same-sex marriage is “fundamentally” about whether same-sex 
couples’ unions are “worthy” of the “honor and recognition” our society 
confers through state-sanctioned marriage.156  Clearly, the court resolves this 
question in the affirmative.   
But a critical step in being able to reach that judgment, says Sandel, is an 
Aristotelian inquiry into the purposes of the social institution of marriage and 
argument about “the virtues it honors” and rewards.157  This requires inquiry 
into whether same-sex unions “fulfill the purposes of the social institution of 
marriage,” such that including gay and lesbian couples is a matter of the “just 
distribution of offices and honors.”158 
How does the court resolve questions about the purposes of marriage?  Is it 
possible to detect the two strands of argument that Sandel identifies – the 
liberal, nonjudgmental strand and the Aristotelian, purposive strand?  Does the 
court rely on a strategy of liberal neutrality emphasizing freedom of choice, 
avoiding controversial moral and religious argument?  Or does it engage in 
substantive moral argument?  As in Goodridge, so in Marriage Cases, we 
contend, both strands play a part in the court’s resolution of the constitutional 
issues. 
The California Supreme Court’s decision offers perhaps the richest account 
to date of why marriage is a vital social institution, significant for society as 
well as for those who marry.159  Tamara Metz observes that the opinion “came 
closer than any other to presenting a complete and compelling constitutional 
defense of the establishment of marriage.”160  Marriage jurisprudence, Metz 
accurately says, has both an individual rights strand, which Sandel might well 
identify with a liberal form of argument, and an institutionalist strand, which 
stresses society’s interest in marriage and the instrumental value of marriage as 
a foundational social institution.161  She contends that the California Supreme 
Court moved beyond dominant “liberal discourse” about marriage by 
observing that protecting the right to marry requires more than merely leaving 
people alone, but also requires the state “to provide – define, confer, and 
 
154 Id. at 445-46.   
155 Id. at 445.  
156 SANDEL, supra note 2, at 254. 
157 Id. at 260. 
158 Id. at 257-58. 
159 Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 419-27. 
160 METZ, supra note 76, at 38. 
161 Id. 
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regulate – a legal framework.”162  Goodridge itself made this point very 
clearly, speaking both of “freedom from” and “freedom to” being at stake in 
the right to marry.163 
In ruling that gay male and lesbian couples were entitled to marry, the 
California Supreme Court emphatically stressed the continuing importance of 
marriage both for individuals and for society,164 melding an individual rights 
perspective with an institutionalist perspective.  In doing so, it drew on many 
traditional arguments about why marriage matters.  In this sense, the California 
ruling might actually be read as a conservative decision: it recognizes and 
seeks to preserve the important functions of marriage, in an age when many 
couples simply cohabit and many people choose to be single.  At the same 
time, the court’s opinion is clearly also a progressive one, for it concludes that 
appeals to history and tradition alone are insufficient constitutional bases for 
excluding same-sex couples from this fundamental institution.165  It is also 
progressive in the sense that it considers and rejects a number of contemporary 
arguments made by the marriage movement against redefining marriage.166 
What are the purposes of marriage?  Why is it fundamental?  The California 
Supreme Court emphasizes the unique role of marriage in providing “official 
recognition” to a family relationship.167  In doing so, the court makes use of 
several traditional arguments typically used by opponents of same-sex 
marriage.  Precisely because marriage is – as conservatives often have argued – 
unique in offering couples societal respect and dignity, the court reasoned that 
the state may not deny it to same-sex couples without undermining 
constitutional guarantees of rights to privacy, liberty, and equality. 
From a long line of federal and state precedents about privacy, liberty, 
equality, and the right to marry, the California Supreme Court distills one basic 
idea: that the fundamental right to marry embraces the right of an individual to 
establish, with a loved one of his or her choice, an officially recognized family 
relationship.168  Here, the court makes what Sandel might call a liberal rights 
argument about choice.  But it is wedded to an argument about the worth of 
official recognition.  Because civil marriage provides the institutional 
framework for families to secure such recognition, the state may not relegate 
same-sex couples to an alternative status without denying them a “core 
element[]” of the right to marry.169 
The California Supreme Court elaborates upon many reasons why both 
society and individuals have a stake in the institution of civil marriage.  
 
162 Id. at 39-40. 
163 Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 959 (Mass. 2003). 
164 Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 422-26. 
165 See id. at 428-30. 
166 See id. at 430-33. 
167 Id. at 428. 
168 See id. at 398-99, 400, 418, 421, 423-27. 
169 Id. at 427. 
 2011] RESPECTING FREEDOM AND CULTIVATING VIRTUES 1333 
 
Ultimately, it asks, “[w]hat is society’s interest in marriage?”170  Or, put 
another way, what are marriage’s purposes?  First, the court tells us, there is 
the channelling function of the family, as the “basic unit of our society.”171  
Older California cases state that the family “channels biological drives that 
might otherwise become socially destructive,” giving order to sexuality and 
procreation.172  Second, civil marriage also facilitates parents’ providing for 
“the care and education of children in a stable environment.”173  Third, society 
relies on marital and family relationships, which are attended by legal 
obligations of support, to provide crucial care for dependents and to relieve the 
public from, or at least share with it, the burden of support.  Society favors 
marriage by linking many rights and responsibilities to it.174  These are 
institutionalist arguments that stress what marriage does for society. 
But marriage, the court insists, is also of “fundamental significance” for 
those who seek to marry.175  Thus, one cannot look at marriage only from an 
institutionalist perspective – that is, how marriage “serve[s] the interests of 
society”176 – and ignore the individual rights perspective – that marriage is also 
a “fundamental right,” an “integral component of an individual’s interest in 
personal autonomy” protected by state constitutional liberty and privacy 
rights.177  Marriage “cannot properly be understood as simply the right to enter 
into such a relationship if (but only if) the Legislature chooses to establish and 
retain it.”178  In elaborating the importance of marriage to individuals, the court 
makes arguments sounding more in liberal themes about a right to form and act 
on a conception of the good life.  Marriage, for example, offers “the most 
socially productive and individually fulfilling relationship that one can enjoy in 
the course of a lifetime.”179  Indeed, constitutional precedents speak of it as 
part of the “pursuit of happiness.”180  The court notes that, of course, people 
can have and raise children outside of marriage, but “the institution of civil 
 
170 See id. at 423. 
171 Id. at 422.  On the “channelling” function of family law, see Carl E. Schneider, The 
Channelling Function in Family Law, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 495 (1992); Linda C. McClain, 
Love, Marriage, and the Baby Carriage: Revisiting the Channelling Function of Family 
Law, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2133 (2007). 
172 Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 422 (quoting De Burgh v. De Burgh, 250 P.2d 598, 601 
(Cal. 1952)). 
173 Id. (quoting De Burgh, 250 P.2d at 601). 
174 Id. 
175 Id. at 423. 
176 Id. at 425. 
177 Id. at 426. 
178 Id. 
179 Id. at 422 (quoting Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582, 586 (Cal. 1988) (internal 
quotations omitted)). 
180 Id. (quoting Perez v. Sharp, 198 P.2d 17, 18 (Cal. 1948) (internal quotations 
omitted)). 
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marriage affords official governmental sanction and sanctuary to the family 
unit.”181  Civil marriage – as a public statement – affords persons a public 
affirmation of commitment and a form of self-expression.  It also enmeshes 
married persons in a broader network of extended family, as well as in the 
“broader family social structure” that is a vital part of community life.182  
Families provide a place in which personality may be developed, intimate 
association pursued, and values and commitments generated that reach beyond 
the family. 
Those who argue against extending marriage to same-sex couples often 
appeal to some of these traditional functions of marriage.  For instance, the 
channelling function of the family – and of family law – provided a rationale 
for preserving the traditional definition of marriage in Hernandez v. Robles,183 
in which New York’s highest court upheld the state’s ban on same-sex 
marriage, and in Justice Cordy’s dissent in Goodridge.184  Opponents of same-
sex-marriage argued before the California Supreme Court that because of the 
historical link between marriage and procreation, the constitutional right to 
marry should be limited to opposite-sex couples.185  Altering the definition of 
marriage, they argued, would send a message that marriage no longer has to do 
with procreation, or with a child’s needing a mother and a father.186 
How did the California Supreme Court resolve this debate about marriage’s 
definition and purposes?  For one thing, it looked to marriage law to reject the 
arguments centered around procreation.  It observed that, although channelling 
procreation may be a reason for marriage, the constitutional right to marry has 
never been confined only to couples capable of procreating.187  Moreover, the 
court held that promoting “responsible procreation” among heterosexuals is not 
a constitutionally sufficient reason to deny same-sex couples the fundamental 
right to marry.188  As the court saw it, the state’s goal of encouraging stable 
two-parent family relationships could be served by extending the benefits of 
marriage to same-sex couples (who after all often raise children together).189 
The California Supreme Court observed that, although providing a stable 
setting for procreation and childrearing is one important purpose of marriage, it 
 
181 Id. at 425. 
182 Id. 
183 855 N.E.2d 1, 21 (N.Y. 2006). 
184 798 N.E.2d 941, 995-96 (Cordy, J., dissenting) (“Paramount among its many 
important functions, the institution of marriage has systematically provided for the 
regulation of heterosexual behavior, brought order to the resulting procreation, and ensured 
a stable family structure in which children will be reared, educated, and socialized.”). 
185 Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 430. 
186 Id. at 432. 
187 Id. at 431. 
188 Id. at 432. 
189 Id. at 433. 
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is not the only one.190  The court also conceived of marriage as an adult 
relationship; state and federal precedents link marriage to adult happiness and 
to “personal enrichment.”191  The court’s resistance to making marriage 
primarily or solely “about” children and not also about adult intimacy is a 
notable interpretation of the purposes of marriage that recurs in California’s 
federal marriage case, Perry v. Schwarzenegger.192  Moreover, the California 
Supreme Court pointed out that the U.S. Supreme Court has upheld the 
constitutional right of married couples to use contraception (thus preventing 
procreation).193 
The California Supreme Court also considered and rejected another 
argument, already mentioned above, made by the marriage movement: that 
allowing same-sex couples to marry will “send a message” that marriage has 
nothing to do with procreation and child rearing, and that it is “immaterial” to 
the state whether a child is raised by her or his biological parents.194  The court 
held that recognizing the constitutional rights of same-sex couples to marry 
diminishes neither the constitutional rights of opposite-sex couples nor the 
legal responsibilities of biological parents.195  If anything, the court concluded, 
recognizing these rights “simply confirms that a stable two-parent family 
relationship, supported by the state’s official recognition and protection, is 
equally as important for the numerous children in California who are being 
raised by same-sex couples as for those being raised by opposite-sex 
couples.”196  As New York’s Chief Judge Judith Kaye wrote in her dissent to 
Hernandez: “There are enough marriage licenses to go around for 
everyone.”197  The court reasoned here that the good of stability is relevant not 
just to households formed by opposite-sex couples, but also to those formed by 
same-sex couples.  Implicitly, there is a moral judgment that these households 
not only will benefit from this recognition and support, but also that they are 
equally worthy of it. 
We want to close by reiterating that the California Supreme Court opinion 
can be seen as being at once progressive and conservative.  It is progressive in 
its unwillingness to defer completely to history and tradition when defining 
 
190 Id. at 432. 
191 Id. 
192 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 946-50 (N.D. Cal. 2010).   
193 Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 432 (discussing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 
(1965)). 
194 Id. 
195 Id. at 433 (“By recognizing this circumstance we do not alter or diminish either the 
legal responsibilities that biological parents owe to their children or the substantial 
incentives that the state provides to a child’s biological parents to enter into and raise their 
children in a stable, long-term committed relationship.”). 
196 Id. 
197 Id. at 451 (quoting Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 30 (N.Y. 2006) (Kaye, C.J., 
dissenting)). 
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constitutional rights.  Though the State of California had urged the court to 
embrace the longstanding definition of marriage as a union between a man and 
a woman, the court looked more critically at history and tradition.  Drawing on 
its own precedents, and subjecting these arguments to critical scrutiny, the 
court stated that “history alone is not invariably an appropriate guide for 
determining the meaning and scope of this fundamental constitutional 
guarantee.”198  In rejecting wholesale deference to tradition, the court insisted 
that neither marriage nor constitutional concepts are static.  In this sense, its 
reasoning resembles that of Goodridge, which spoke of marriage as an 
“evolving paradigm.”199  The court also invoked Justice Kennedy in Lawrence: 
“[T]imes can blind us to certain truths and later generations can see that laws 
once thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress.”200 
Yet the opinion can be seen as conservative in its strong emphasis on the 
unique symbolic value of marriage and its invocation of the primacy of 
marriage.  Legal scholars and activists who argue for de-centering marriage by 
developing domestic partnership laws and other legal statuses alternative to 
civil marriage201 might criticize the majority’s insistence on the inadequacy of 
domestic partnership as a legal alternative to marriage.  The court’s marshaling 
of traditional arguments about the importance of marriage – along with its 
emphasis on the risk that domestic partnership will be perceived as lesser and 
as inferior – may lead some progressives to lament that a real opportunity for 
breaking the monopoly that marriage holds on our social and legal imagination 
was lost.  While we can argue about the society we ideally should have, for 
now the California Supreme Court’s point is cogent: so long as marriage exists 
and is only open to opposite-sex couples, a marriage/domestic partnership two-
track system conveys a very real and serious insult to same-sex couples, 
communicating that their family relationships are not worthy of equal dignity 
and respect. 
Far from resolving the controversy over same-sex marriage, the California 
Supreme Court’s opinion was a catalyst for the Proposition 8 campaign to 
amend the California Constitution by defining marriage as the union of one 
man and one woman.202  These issues of worth and of the symbolic message of 
marriage versus domestic partnership are also central in the ongoing federal 
litigation concerning the constitutionality of Proposition 8, as demonstrated in 
Perry v. Schwarzenegger.  There the federal district court concluded that views 
 
198 Id. at 399. 
199 Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d, 941, 967 (Mass. 2003). 
200 Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 451 (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579 
(2003)). 
201 See, e.g., NANCY D. POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE: VALUING 
ALL FAMILIES UNDER THE LAW 3 (2008); Nancy D. Polikoff, Ending Marriage as We Know 
It, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 201, 202 (2003).  
202 See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5 (“Only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or 
recognized in California.”). 
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about the inferiority of same-sex couples and their families animated the 
campaign for the proposition,203 and held that Proposition 8 violated both the 
Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the United States 
Constitution.204  The case is now on appeal before the Ninth Circuit, which 
recently issued an order staying further proceedings and certifying a question 
to the California Supreme Court concerning whether the proponents of 
Proposition 8 have standing to defend its constitutionality in court when the 
State of California has refused to do so.205  The case may eventually end up 
before the U.S. Supreme Court.  Chief Judge Vaughn Walker’s lengthy 
opinion is heavily laden with findings of fact and citations to specific evidence 
on these findings to support his conclusions of law.206  Whatever the ultimate 
outcome of the case on appeal, Chief Judge Walker’s opinion provides a rich 
example of the intertwining of liberal and civic republican arguments – 
autonomy together with worth – in justifying a right to same-sex marriage.207 
CONCLUSION 
To recapitulate: as did the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in 
Goodridge, so did the California Supreme Court in the Marriage Cases present 
liberal arguments sounding in freedom of choice and nondiscrimination 
alongside Aristotelian or civic republican arguments sounding in purposes, 
moral goods, and worth.  Sandel may be right that the latter arguments help 
resolve the issue.  But we maintain that both types of argument can stand side 
by side.  And what we said above about Goodridge in relation to political 
liberalism and conventional constitutional doctrine applies as well to the 
 
203 Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 930-32 (N.D. Cal. 2010). 
204 See id. at 991. 
205 See Order Certifying a Question to the Supreme Court of California, 638 F.3d 1191, 
1192 (9th Cir. 2011). 
206 See Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 953-91, 993. 
207 On questions of worth, see, for example, id. at 973 (Finding 58) (“Proposition 8 
places the force of law behind stigmas against gays and lesbians, including: gays and 
lesbians do not have intimate relationships similar to heterosexual couples; gays and 
lesbians are not as good as heterosexuals; and gay and lesbian relationships do not deserve 
the full recognition of society.”); id. at 974 (Finding  60) (“Proposition 8 reserves the most 
socially valued form of relationship (marriage) for opposite-sex couples.”); and id. at 999-
1000 (“The evidence supports two points which together show Proposition 8 does not 
advance any of the [state’s] identified interests: (1) same-sex parents and opposite-sex 
parents of equal quality . . . and (2) Proposition 8 does not make it more likely that opposite-
sex couples will marry and raise offspring biologically related to both parents.”).  On themes 
of marriage as an important choice, see, for example, id. at 961 (Finding 34) (“Marriage is 
the state recognition and approval of a couple’s choice to live with each other, to remain 
committed to one another and to form a household based on their own feelings about one 
another and to join in an economic partnership and support one another and any 
dependents.”); and id. at 993 (“The right to marry has been historically and remains the right 
to choose a spouse and, with mutual consent, join together and form a household.”). 
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decision of the California Supreme Court.  For its analysis of purposes and 
ends sits comfortably within conventional constitutional law doctrine with no 
need of Aristotle or teleological analysis to make sense of it.  And its holding 
fits comfortably with familiar liberal commitments to equal concern and 
respect, dignity, and securing the status of free and equal citizenship for all. 
 
